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Present conditions – the invalid Constitution 
   The federation of Serbia and Montenegro, FR Yugoslavia, was formed with the 
establishing of the Constitution on April 27th 1992. The decision to proclaim this 
Constitution was made by the Federal Council of the Parliament of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Although this body, according to the SFRY Constitution, had the 
authority to decide on the Constitutional amends, delegations of the four republics, which 
were in the meantime internationally recognized as independent, and sovereign 
countries, did not participate in the work of the Council. Thus the legal status of this body 
became constitutionally and legally problematic, and, consequentially, the Council lost 
the authority to perform any function, much less to proclaim a new Constitution. 
   Such an act of establishing the union of Serbia and Montenegro cast a shadow over 
the choice of the majority of population in the two countries to continue living within the 
common state, after the former federation had disintegrated. The best way to express 
that choice was contained in the democratic procedure of establishing the two-part 
federation, which would guarantee the legitimacy and legality of the new federation. 
Instead of that, the representatives of the two republics decided that the very act of 
proclaiming the new Constitution should be the link between the former and the new 
federation. 
   Establishing of the Constitution of FRY was rather in connection with the international 
circumstances of the disintegration of the former state, than with the internal conditions 
or the true need to ensure the stable constitutional foundations for the new state union of 
Serbia and Montenegro. The new Constitution was supposed to ensure legal and state 
continuity of the existing and former state, which would confirm the thesis of the 
secession of the four republics from the former federation. The Constitutional 
establishing was governed by the foreign political interests of the Government officials of 
that period, and it was therefore done in a hurry, without legal foundation or the 
necessary democratic procedure. The Constitution was, in other words, an act of 
unsuitable political engineering, not of general declaration of those for whom it would 
further on represent the principle and standard of their lives. 
   The entire procedure of establishing the Constitution of FRY was completely initiated 
and fully controlled by high officials of the two parties in power in Serbia and 
Montenegro. The first and only concept that was the basis for the text of the Constitution 
(Bases of the System and Functioning of Yugoslavia as a Common State) was formed 
within a small circle of the most influential politicians of the two republics. It contained 
basic constitutional principles and all the important institutional solutions that were the 
ground plan for the Constitution. This plan was accepted without discussion in the 
Parliaments of the republics, which were dominated by the political parties of the real 
framers of the Constitution. Finally, the Constitution was proclaimed in the legally non-
existent  Parliament of a non-existent state. Between the first initiative and the 
proclaiming of the Constitution only two and a half months passed by, during which time 
both the initiative and the ground plan were almost unknown to the citizens of the both 
republics. It is true the referendum was held in Montenegro, however not on the ground 
plan of the Constitution, but on the principal issue of common state with Serbia. The 
great majority of the electoral body was in favor of the common state, but this kind of 
referendum could not replace the necessary public and expert discussion on the ground 
plan of the Constitution. Neither the referendum on the ground plan of the Constitution, 
nor the referendum on the issue of common state with Montenegro was held in Serbia. 
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   The manner in which the Constitution of FRY was proclaimed indicated the future bad 
fortune of the country. The Constitution was observed as ill as it was proclaimed, and 
most of all by those who proclaimed it. Eight years later the constitutional life in FRY is 
just hopeless. It is not enough to say that the Federal Constitution is not being observed, 
or that it is constantly violated by certain people in power. Our politicians violate the 
Constitution on a daily basis, sometimes by an isolated act and sometimes by creating a 
lasting nonconstitutional situation. For instance, the president of the federal state 
appearing at the congress of a political party and being elected a leader of that party, in 
spite of the regulation (article 97. paragraph 4. of the Constitution FRY) that expressly 
forbids the president of the republic to perform any other public function or profession, 
except his constitutional duty as chief of state. 
   The example for creating a nonconstitutional situation is refusal to verify the mandates 
of Montenegrin representatives in the Council of Republics, after changes have been 
made in the republic law of Montenegro. Legally elected Montenegrin representatives 
cannot take their seats in the upper house of the federal legislative body, while some 
other Montenegrin representatives whose mandates have expired are still members of 
the Council. The activities of the Federal Parliament are thus made nonconstitutional, 
the federal authorities are illegitimate, and this situation continues to exist for months 
and years.  
    The violations of the Constitution are alarming neither from the point of view of 
political life, for which the Constitution is supposed to set strict rules, nor of the political 
factors and constitutional authorities. The concern of the ordinary citizen is much worse. 
Due to the numerous and constant violations of the Constitution by the authorities, the 
fundamental civil rights are endangered. What is more, the citizen does not believe that 
he can ensure and protect his rights and interests by turning to the authorities in charge 
of the protection of these rights. In other words, the Yugoslavia of today is endangered 
by legal insecurity, chaos and anomie.  
   Moreover, a great number of federal laws are not in conformity with the Federal 
Constitution. The constitutional law passed together with the Constitution prescribes that 
the legislator should bring a number of laws into conformity with the Federal 
Constitution, until the end of 1994. The time has been extended on several occasions, 
but up until now the Federal legislator has not fulfilled his obligation to bring many 
important laws into conformity with the Federal Constitution (for example, Law on 
Criminal proceedings). Also, the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia is still not in 
conformity with the Federal Constitution. In other words, although Serbia is a member of 
the Federation, its system is not in agreement with the federal. 
   Although the extant constitutional solutions have ensured, at least in theory, for FRY to 
be a common economic market, soon after the Constitution was proclaimed, the 
constitutional system derogated also in the field of economy. Political control over 
economy caused the economies of Serbia and Montenegro to be treated as two 
competitive companies “Serbia” and “Montenegro”, which fight over the bigger share of 
the national product. The real interests of particular companies were neglected. Different 
strategies were used as regards buying foreign currency on formal and informal market, 
monetary policy, customs policy, black- marketing etc.  
   Soon after the proclaiming of the Constitution begins the violation of the constitutional 
system, concerning the distribution of authority between the federal and the republic 
levels of government. For instance, the Government of Serbia has by its regulations 
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temporarily controlled specific areas, which were under the jurisdiction of the federal 
state, such as foreign trade and antimonopolistic policy. 
   During 1997 the financial relations between the Federal Government and the 
Government of Montenegro were seriously disturbed. The Federal Government 
gradually stopped paying in the prescribed subsidies to the pension-fund of Montenegro, 
while at the same time the Government of Montenegro gradually stopped paying in the 
prescribed incomes into the Federal Budget. 
   After the elections in Montenegro in 1997, the illegal status of the remaining 
representatives of Montenegro in the Council of Republics of the Federal Parliament, 
and Montenegro breaking off the relations with the Federal Government, has no 
information of the federal monetary, fiscal, customs, foreign exchange and other policies. 
   In autumn 1999 the Government of Montenegro took extreme measures. First, it took 
over both customhouses in Montenegro, claiming the right to collect customs duties and 
to have independent customs policy. Second, Montenegro declares fiscal sovereignty, 
i.e. claims the right to keep all the collected income in Montenegro and to revoke the 
obligation of paying in certain incomes to the federal budget. Besides, fiscal sovereignty 
means the right for an independent tax policy, disregarding the regulations in the Federal 
Law. Third, Montenegro introduced deutsche mark on an equal footing with dinar, in 
order to replace dinar in the financial transactions, which put an end to the common 
monetary system of FRY. 
   Federal and Serbian authorities responded by stopping the financial transactions 
between Montenegro and Serbia, and prohibiting the trade of almost all kinds of 
merchandise between Serbia and Montenegro. 
   As a result of all these measures, the common economic area of FRY ceased to exist, 
and two separate areas divided by the border between the republics were created. Not 
one important feature of the common market and the common economy is functioning 
properly: there is no free circulation of money and goods, no common customs system, 
no common fiscal system, no common monetary system, no common foreign exchange 
and foreign trade system. The difference between the constitutional solutions and actual 
circumstances is getting bigger and we cannot claim any more that the economy of FRY 
functions according to the federal regulations. What’s more, the question is whether 
Serbia and Montenegro make one economic area, common market, or even a customs 
union, or not. Essentially, the answer is no. Except for the fact that the customs duties 
on trade between the Serbia and Montenegro have not (yet) been introduced, we can 
say that at this moment these two republics are economically separate states. 
   The breaking of economic relations between Serbia and Montenegro is not to the 
advantage of any of the republics. Many companies are oriented to the market of the 
other republic as a result of the decades of business in the same country, 
complementary capacities, and the buyers being accustomed to the goods from the 
neighboring republic.  
   This condition is economically harmful, politically unacceptable, and legally untenable. 
It clearly justifies the necessity of separation or urgent reconstruction of the state union 





Basic principles of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro 
    
   The manner of proclaiming the Constitution of FRY and its open violation by the 
republic authorities of Serbia and Montenegro, and even by the federal organs 
themselves, clearly manifest the complete failure of this two-part federation. In order to 
survive, it has to be re-established on different political grounds and new constitutional 
principles. Since both in Serbia and in Montenegro still exists widespread and deeply 
rooted orientation towards the common state, despite the dissatisfaction with the present 
federation, the new state system must be the result of well considered and mutually 
accepted conditions, principles and concrete institutional solutions of the future union. It 
has to express not only historical aspirations of the people of Serbia and Montenegro 
towards living together, but also the need of the citizens to live in an well-organized and 
functional community, which would be able to promote their interests and satisfy their 
everyday needs. In this sense, every functional model of a state community must be 
complementary in its system to the processes of regional and European integration. 
   The main principles stated here follow the need for modernization of the public policy 
and administration, and they should respect the unique singularity of this union. Serbia 
and Montenegro are not equal in population, territory and economic potentials. The 
condition of equality is unusually difficult to fulfill in system and institutions, and 
especially in everyday life of the community, although it is a crucial condition. Because of 
that, both the main principles and the actual institutional solutions, which should follow 
them closely, will have as a starting point the idea of “ minimal federation” (model of the 
common functions, which is achievable in the extant social, economic and political 
circumstances. Although the state crisis of the present federation is politically induced, 
organizing the state union of two parts of unequal size, which want to retain their 
important political and national autonomies, is an extremely difficult task. 
   The main principles of the state union, which are to turned into operative and 
functional institutional solutions are:  
· Minimal and efficient government. It is presumed that both Serbia and 
Montenegro will turn to the liberal state concept, to that type of government in the 
widest sense, whose main characteristic is minimal regulative approach to the 
public affairs. If both the units and their state union turn to the concept of modern 
market economy and the rule of the law, then the principal orientation towards 
minimal and efficient state is the only justified solution. The condition is that such a 
concept of administrating public affairs should prevail in the republics, in order for 
the common functions transferred to the federation to be small in number and 
performed by a reasonable number of representative and expert individuals. 
· Principle of subsidiarity. The federation will have only those functions which, in 
the common interest of the members, can be performed better and more efficient 
on the level of union than on the level of the member republics. This is the 
principle for the distribution of authority between the union and the members, 
which should be carried into effect in the Constitution. The supposition of authority 
is on the side of the members, which means that the federal authorities should be 
enumerated in the Federal Constitution. It does not mean that these authorities are 
effectuated only by the federal organs, since the Constitution would also include 
the right of federal and republic organs to cooperate in effectuating the federal 
authority. The principle of subsidiarity would also be applied to the member 
republics. Its effect would be the decentralization of power in the republics, in 
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Serbia in favor of the regions and municipalities, and in Montenegro in favor of 
municipalities. The common goal is to create a system in which the decisions will 
be made on the levels closest to the citizens. 
· Constitutional principle. The Federal Constitution, being a result of 
democratically expressed and general will of the citizens of the republics, becomes 
a relevant standard for all the decisions within its scope. It is the fundament and 
guarantee of the principle of the rule of the law in a state community. For that 
principle to be consistently brought into effect, it is necessary that the Federal 
Constitution should guarantee not only the equality of the members, but also the 
legal equality (fundamental rights and freedoms) of all citizens of the federation. 
Without the efficient protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, the Federal 
Constitution would have a limited legal jurisdiction on the level of the rights of the 
members, and it would be practically reduced to interstate treaty. The federal 
principle (equality of members) would not be in balance with the democratic 
principle (equality of citizens) and the rule of the law would not have its full 
constitutional sense. Besides, the constitutional principle thus established is an 
important condition for the future entering the process of European integration, 
since only the state of constitutional type is authorized to start the integration and 
capable to fulfil the obligations which ensue.  
· Principle of cooperation in the state union. The new institutions of the union of 
Serbia and Montenegro should contribute to the establishing of trust between the 
political representatives of the citizens. For that purpose, the Constitution is to 
establish new mechanisms of cooperation between the member republics and the 
union, as well as between the members themselves. Besides the usual 
institutional solutions, according to which the members are directly represented in 
the union through their representatives (upper house of the Federal Parliament), 
there are also the rights of the members to cooperate directly in the performing of 
the executive and judicial functions in the field of federal jurisdiction. This principle 
increases the responsibility of the member republics for the functioning of the state 
union and contributes to the strengthening the federal trust. Besides, they should 
cooperate in the autonomous fields of jurisdiction in regulating and performing the 
adequate functions on the interparliamentary and intergovernmental level. For that 
purpose, the member republics can make adequate contracts and form common 
bodies, independent from the federal organs, to make sure the terms of the 
contract are fulfilled.  
· Principle of the distribution of authority on the federal level. Besides the 
vertical distribution of authority between the federation and the member republics 
(principle of subsidiarity), there is also a horizontal distribution between the 
branches of government (legislative, executive and judiciary) and their 
constitutional distribution between different federal bodies. The system of 
government on the federal level should represent a federal parliamentary republic, 
where the branches of government will be democratically balanced, with the rights 
and obligations of mutual control and cooperation. The Constitution should specify 
the way of electing, structure and authority of every federal organ, the procedures 
of decision-making and mechanisms of performing their functions. This system of 
government should include the instruments of the Constitutional Court for the 
control of constitutionality and legality as guarantees of the principle of the rule of 
the law. 
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· Democratic procedure of establishing the Federal Constitution. The bearers of 
constitutional power are the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. In the original and 
residual sense the sovereignty belongs to them. They are also entitled to make a 
final decision, either directly or through their representatives, on the amendments to 
the Federal Constitution. Since the Republic Parliaments have a significant role in 
the procedure of establishing the Constitution, it is necessary that their decision be 
preceded by democratic elections. Democratic conventions in the republics also 
imply public debates, in which political will of the citizens and opinions of the experts 
are expressed. After the public debate, the newly formed Parliaments of Serbia and 
Montenegro should declare themselves for or against the ground plan of the 
Constitution. If it is accepted by the majority of the representatives, referendums are 
held in the republics. The ground plan is accepted provided that more than fifty 
percent of the voters in both republics decide in favor of it. The Constitution is 
proclaimed by Council of Republics of the Federal Parliament, after which elections 
for the Council of Citizens are held according to the regulations included in the new 
Constitution. 
   The basic principles stated here should fulfil two essential conditions: equality of the 
member republics and functionality of the federal state. The state union has no political 
purpose, unless both conditions are fulfilled. The degree in which these conditions are 
fulfilled can be observed and estimated only in the institutional mechanism of the new 
Constitution, which should operationalize the basic principles. 
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Fundamental rights and freedoms 
General approach 
 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro must 
be inviolable, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and equal throughout the whole 
country. The fundamental rights of the citizens of the federation must be in concordance 
with the Convention of the European Council on the protection of human rights and basic 
freedoms, as well as with the additional protocols to the Convention. The extent of 
protection of the basic rights of citizens of the federation cannot fall short of the one 
guaranteed by the aforesaid Convention, nor can the regulations on the fundamental 
rights of the citizens of the federation of Montenegro and Serbia be interpreted or 
applied in opposition to the terms and spirit of the Convention, in the institutions of the 
federal union and member republics. 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens are established by the Federal Constitution, and 
the regulations of the Constitution on the fundamental rights are directly applied. They 
do not need to be concretized in the laws, nor must the possible laws be in opposition to 
the constitutional regulations. 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens determine the scope of the influence of the 
Federal Government and simultaneously they are the source of concrete obligations for 
the state union and its member republics. 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens are guaranteed by the federation and 
simultaneously by its member republics, which are primarily responsible for the 
protection of the fundamental rights, whose standards are, according to the European 
criteria, set by the federal state. 
   The federal legal system will provide protection for the fundamental rights of a citizen, 
if such protection is not provided by the legal system of the member republic. The citizen 
of the federation will be entitled to start legal proceedings against the federation in the 
European Civil Rights Court, if the protection is not provided by the legal system of the 
federal state. 
 
Catalogue of the fundamental rights of the citizens 
 
   The fundamental civil rights of the citizens of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro 
must particularly include: 
1) the right of life,   
2) the right of human dignity,    
3)  the right of protection of physical integrity,    
4)  the right of personality and name,  
5) the right of equal treatment by the law and fair trial,  
6) the right of freedom of conscience and religion,     
7) the right of freedom of thought, media and scientific research, 
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8) the right of peaceful rallying,  
9) the right of forming associations,  
10) the right of privacy of mail and communications, 
11) the right of joining properties and inviolability of the private property,  
12) the right of family and protection of children, 
13) the right of education,  
14) the right of inviolability of habitation,  
15) social and economic rights,  
16) the right of addressing the state institutions, participating in the administration of the 
federal state and efficient supervision of the authorities. 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens must not be limited neither by an act of the state 
union, nor by an act of a member republic, nor by an act of any of their organs, nor by an 
act of any individual. Only in the state of emergency or war, can certain of these 
fundamental constitutional rights (8, 10, 11, 13, 15) be suspended, only in principle and 
by a general act of the state union, and only until the termination of the state of 
emergency or war. 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens of the state union as included in the 
Constitution, present the least guaranteed degree of these rights. The state union, as 
well as the member republics, is required to extend the catalogue of the fundamental 
rights of the citizens. 
 
   Legal protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens 
 
   The fundamental rights of the citizens are protected by the regular courts of the 
member republics. In order to provide this protection, there must be a multi-stage legal 
proceedings.  
   Besides, the fundamental rights of the citizens can be protected by the Constitutional 
courts of the member republics. 
   The corpus of the fundamental rights of the citizens of the state union, as included in 
its Constitution, has the protection of the Federal High Court, Federal Constitutional 
Court, as well as the European Human Rights Court.  
 
Protection of minority rights-rights of national and ethnic groups 
 
   Minorities enjoy a special protection of the state union and its member republics. The 
protection of minorities must be in concordance with the regulations of the Pact on the 
political and civil rights, the 1992 Declaration of UN and the 1995 European Council 
General convention on the protection of national minorities. 
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   The subject of protection of minority rights is a collectivity. The organ of the protected 
collectivity is authorized to start the procedure for protection of rights, whether the right 
of the entire collectivity, its part, or an individual is violated. 
   Minority rights must particularly include:  
1. The right of protection from assimilation, 
2. The right of use of language,  
3. The right of protection of the cultural identity, 
4. The right of education, 
5. The right of protection of the cultural heritage. 
   The member republics are responsible to the state union for protecting the minorities in 
practice. State union is authorized to warn the member republic about the problem of 
protection of minorities on its territory, and to demand the balancing of that protection 
with generally accepted and constitutionally guaranteed principles of minority protection. 
The chief of state can ask for the opinion of the Federal Constitution Court.  
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Distribution of authority between the union and the members 
 
   The constitutional starting-point for determining the functions of the state union is that 
they are consensually given by the republics to the federation and that they are being 
rationally performed, to the interest of both member republics and the federation as a 
whole. Many functions of common interest for both the republics and their citizens, which 
are under the jurisdiction of the member republics, can be performed in close 
cooperation of the institutions of the republics. For that kind of joint control, which will 
certainly include a great number of fields (energy, transportation, telecommunications, 
science, technological development, social policy, culture, ecology, internal security, 
etc.), there should be a constitutional recommendation on the direct cooperation of the 
republics. In this sense, there would be less fields of authority of the Federation, 
compared with the existing Federal Constitution (article 77), and they would be covered 
by federal organs or by federal and republic organs together.  
   Federal fields of authority would be: 
·  The fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens, including the rights and 
protection of ethnic (minority) groups and communities; 
· International relations and foreign policy;  
· National defense; 
· Bases of the economic system for protection of the common market. 
As it is obvious, the starting-point of this concept is the minimum authority of the 
federation, considering the fact that the modern federations are not characterized by the 
number of the functions but by the way they are performed. Starting from the liberal idea 
of the minimal state, the federation of Serbia and Montenegro will perform only those 
functions, without which the system of union could not be efficient. However, in 
distinction from confederate type of union, this federation (its institutions) will have the 
necessary functional autonomy in organizational, legal and financial fields. 
   The original authority of the federation is determined by the Constitution, which 
contains consent of the units for the aforesaid fields of authority to be transferred to the 
federal level. Also, all other possible fields of authority, which can be more efficiently 
performed on a federal level than in the member republics separately or in cooperation, 
can be transferred to the federal organs only with the consent of member republics. So, 
the federation does not have the possibility to expand its authority by itself (implied 
powers), but only based on the consent of the members. 
   This way of transferring the authority to the federation is similar to the confederate 
solution, although it is being used since the beginning in the European Community, 
which has, by all criteria, overgrown the level of confederate interstate arrangements. 
The classic distinction between the federation and confederation is based on the 
criterion on which level of government has the authority to distribute authority. If it is the 
members, then it is a confederation, and if the union has such an authority, then it is a 
federation (German theory of Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Our orientation to the first 
approach is not, however, the orientation to state union of Serbia and Montenegro as a 
confederation. Concerning the function, within its authority, the union will be based on 
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federal principles, and it will be, as it is already mentioned, a federal parliamentary 
republic. But we believe that the fundamental problems of the union should be should be 
solved with the mutual consent of the members. 
   When the particular proposal on the federal authority is concerned, besides the 
efficiency, this proposal is also governed by another reason. It is the strategic orientation 
of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro towards the European integration. Precisely 
in the aforesaid fields of federal authority –fundamental rights and minority protection, 
foreign policy and defense, common market with four freedoms (free trade, capital, labor 
and services) –this state union must gradually adjust its policy and legislature to the valid 
regulations of the European organizations, whether it is the European Council, OSCE, or 
European Community. It could not be performed unless the state union itself possesses 
an efficient system of decision-making in these fields. 
   Within its jurisdiction, the union would, through its organs and with the cooperation of 
the republic organs, establish and conduct the policy, pass and execute the federal laws, 
other regulations and general acts, and provide the proper constitutional and legal 
protection. In all the other fields, which would, according to the principle of supposition of 
authority being on the side of the members, be under the authority of the republics, the 
common interest would be realized in an interrepublic system of relations with the 
possible aid and assistance of the federal organs. 
   In order to ensure the maximum equality of the member republics, as well as the 
functionality of the federal state, the performing of federal authorities is defined as 
following: 
· Principle decisions (laws and other decisions) would be made by the Federal 
Parliament in a bicameral procedure for every legal act or decision, by majority of 
votes of federal representatives in both Councils of the Parliament. Orientation 
towards the comparatively small number of jurisdictions of the state union, some of 
which would be mixed and some independent, stipulates that the efficient 
mechanism of decision-making in the Federal Parliament must exist. Therefore, only 
absolute majority is required in both Councils of the Parliament, without qualified 
majority for any issue within the federal authority (as opposed to the solution 
provided in the article 90, paragraph 2 and 3 of the present Constitution). 
· A number of federal functions would be in the system of mixed jurisdictions, where 
the Federal Parliament establishes the bases of the system and the Parliaments of 
the Republics perform specific legal regulation of the matter in question. These 
federal decisions are made in the member republics through certain acts of the 
Republic Parliaments and the republic administrative organs, with possible aid and 
necessary control by the Federal Government and Federal Courts. These are the 
jurisdictions which should function according to this system of decision-making and 
executing: fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens, property relations, tax 
system, banking system, commercial law, old-age benefits and insurance of property 
and person. 
· The rest of the federal jurisdictions –foreign policy, civil defense, monetary system, 
contract law, equities and customs system – function according to the system of 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal organs. When the executing of laws, regulations 
and general acts from this field is in question, the Federal Government can transfer 
its authority to executive and administrative bodies of the republic, providing them 
with its assistance and control. 
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· The Federal Constitution should include the possibility for the republics to participate 
independently in various fields of international cooperation (different regional 
economic, cultural and ecological integration) and enter into international 
agreements. The only restriction is that such forms of international cooperation are 
not made to the disadvantage of the other republic or the state union, on which 
subject the Federal Constitutional Court makes the final decision. 
   As it is obvious, the suggested concept of the distribution of authority aims at 
balancing the two levels of government (federal and republic), in the specific conditions 
of the two-part federation, in order to ensure the autonomy for both levels of government 
and constant cooperation in performing their tasks. The fact that the member republics 
are left with wider authority represents the contribution to the decentralization of the 
entire system of government and, simultaneously, establishes a practice new in our 
conditions, of direct horizontal linking the republic levels of government (on the Swiss 
model of Konkordanzdemokratie or the American model of intergovernmental relations). 
On the other hand, the republics, in the field of federal mixed jurisdictions, by the 
additional regulation of the federal regulation, concretize the federal legislature and 
through their executive and administrative organs apply the federal regulations. (This is 
also known to be the practice of Swiss and German federalism). Finally, in the field of 
exclusive authority of federal institutions, there is still a possibility of transferring the 
authority for executing the federal regulations from the federal to the republic organs. 
   In all three cases, the Constitution insists upon the responsibility of the republic 
institutions for the functioning of the state union, which excludes the possibility of 
outvoting one republic and strengthens the confidence in the federation. In this way we 
can avoid the system which makes it possible for one member to put a veto that would 
block the decision-making on the federal level, as it is the case with the suggested 
document of the Montenegrin Government on the redefining of the federation. 
Considering that this will be the first constitutional and democratic federation in this 
region, we believe that this model of distribution of authority, the most delicate issue of 
every federalism, provides a good foundation for a democratic and functional federation 
of Serbia and Montenegro. 
   As an addition to this concept of distribution of authority, there should also be a system 
of federal institutions that would be able to provide the functioning of the government on 




   Suppositions and principles 
 
   The suggestion for the distribution of economic authority in the union of Montenegro 
and Serbia will be based on two essential suppositions: 
· that the liberal and democratic system will be established in the whole Yugoslavia, 
which means that the economic system will progressively aim at liberalization and 
creating of the real market economy. This will diminish the role of the state in the 
economic life, including the financial transactions, and that will reduce the tension 
both between the republics and within them,  
·  that the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro want to live in a free and prosperous 
union, which means that the political factors will not be a significant impediment to 
finding good solutions in the economic area. However, because of the bad 
experience during the last decade, we suggest the lower degree of the economic 
integration than the one we find the most favorable, because it is much better to start 
from the lower degree of integration and gradually increase it, if such interest is 
shown, than to insist upon the optimum immediately without paying attention to the 
public opinion (especially in Montenegro). Consequently, whenever we face a 
problem on whether to centralize a function or leave it to the republics, with equally 
strong arguments or with relatively low expenses, we will decide in the favor of the 
latter.  
 The basic principles of the union in the economic area should be: 
· unlimited freedom of circulation of goods, services, production factors, foreign 
currency, gold, real estate etc. on the entire territory of the union, with the prices and 
conditions not being controlled by the state,  
· creating of the real market economy, with the domination of the private property, 
competition and rule of the law as the main principles, 
·  opening to the world and entering the international institutions, 
· efficient performing of the state functions, with respect towards the interests of the 
republics, individuals and their organizations, i.e. the principle of subsidiarity, which 
implies that the responsibility for the making and executing the decisions is 
transferred to the lowest instance of government where this can be successfully 
performed. 
   The economic theory does not approve the confederate system, unless it is the first 
step in creating a more closely connected federal union. The analysis of the efficiency of 
negotiating of the sovereign participants in the process of bringing state decisions, 
whether it is performed by the model of the Nobel-prize winner Ronald Coase, or on the 
basis of the theory of games, points out the inferiority, compared to the decision-making 
in parliamentary system of the federal type. An example of unsuccessful negotiation is 
SFRY, when many necessary economic decisions could not have been made as a result 
of the right of veto of every participant. The confederate concept may have the 
advantages of political nature as compared to the federal, but it is beyond the range of 
economic analysis. 
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   In the event that an economic union cannot ensure efficient decision-making on the 
minimal common economic functions, there are two possibilities: this union should either 
cease to exist, or grow into a functional union. This is a consequence of the fact that 
such a union would frequently come into the crisis of decision-making and confrontations 
between the members, which would cause economic damage and annul potential 
advantages of being a part of the union. 
   The most important and best known economic argument in favor of the state unions is 
expanding the market, followed by significant profits from the scale economy, division of 
labor, and exchange based on comparative advantages. Unrestricted trade is certainly to 
the benefit of all and in the common interest, so it is necessary to find the way to ensure 
it and maximize the gain. This is particularly important for a small country, which unites 
with a much larger country (or group of countries), because the gain due the expansion 
of the market is much bigger to it than to its partners. Creating the economic union (or 
federal state) makes it impossible for the governments of the members to, through the 
regulation of the interstate trade, give preference to their citizens and companies to the 
disadvantage of the foreign citizens and companies, which would lead to the decreasing 
of the trade and losses for all the members. 
   The reason of the economy of the extent in the state functions (services) is an 
argument for the creation of the common states. For example, it is cheaper for the state 
members of the federation to have only one Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one Customs 
Administration, or one army, than to form these (and other) institutions separately. 
      Every government, influenced by its own ideas and the ideas of interested groups, 
inevitably aims at the monopoly of government and power, which endangers economic 
efficiency and brings damage. A good way to limit the monopoly and disperse the power 
is the existence of several governments on different levels, which would be competitive 
to a certain extent, and represent a limitation and control to each other. In the individual 
states, especially smaller ones, the interested groups gain influence over the executive 
and legislative power much easier than in federations, where the competition between 
numerous interested groups is stronger and therefore the influence of each of them is 
smaller. Consequentially, from the point of view of economic efficiency, federation is 
better than a smaller unitary state. 
 
   Common economic area 
 
   The economic union of Montenegro and Serbia can take different forms, since there 
are different kinds of economic integration. There are four basic types of the integration.  
   Free trade zone: there is no customs for the trade between the members, but every 
member has an independent trade policy towards the non-members. 
   Customs union: there is no customs for the trade between the members, and there is a 
common trade (customs) policy towards the non-members. 
   Common market: there are no restrictions for the trade between the members; there is 
a common trade policy towards the non-members and the freedom of circulation of 
production factors (labor and capital) between the members is guaranteed. 
   Economic union (common economic area): common market + common currency and 
monetary policy + harmonized tax policy + common fiscal policy. 
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   The higher degree of economic integration, the bigger are the economic gains for the 
states members of the integration. A fuller integration is usually disturbed by other, 
mostly political factors. 
   Free market zones are inferior to the customs unions because the increase of the 
trade between the members is smaller. Therefore these zones are usually only the first 
step towards wider integration. Customs unions are frequent in the modern world. Their 
transformation into common market or economic union, as more efficient forms of 
integration, is determined by political factors. 
   There are sufficient reasons for the federation of Serbia and Montenegro to be based 
on the concept of economic union. These two republics have been a part of the 
economic union for eight decades, which created strong economic ties and habit of 
people to use goods and services from the other republic. The economic union is 
included in the Constitution of FRY and in the platform of the Montenegrin Government 
“Bases for the new relations of Montenegro and Serbia”, which means that there is a 
general consent concerning this issue. The last but not the least, the economic union is, 
from the economic point of view, the best solution for the union of Montenegro and 
Serbia. 
   The essential characteristic of economic union and common market is the provision of 
free circulation of goods, services, labor and capital on the whole territory of the union. 
This freedom should be guaranteed by the Constitution, which would be a basis and a 
limitation for the legal regulations. 
   Numerous system laws influence the unity of the economic area. Besides the customs, 
monetary and fiscal legislature, we can mention company law, including banks and 
insurance, property law, stock markets, equities, old-age benefits etc. Comparative 
experience is various: for instance, in the European Community and the USA, company 
law is on the level of the national states, while, when the banking, stock markets and 
equities are concerned, the control in the European Community is on the national level, 
and in the USA on the federal level. A certain uniformity of the laws in the union of 
Serbia and Montenegro is necessary, whether concerning the civil rights and property of 
the citizens, who usually do not have the opportunity to get acquainted with the 
regulations of the other member, or concerning the protection of the common market. 
The common legislature of the federal level and level of the members is probably, in 
present conditions, the best solution concerning the company law, stock markets, 
property law and old-age benefits. The laws on the bases of the system would be 
passed on federal level, while on the level of the members, the regulations would be 
more detailed. Such a distribution of authority could ensure the unity of the market, and 
also enable the individual characteristics to be expressed, and even allow the 
competition between them, useful for the economic life, since it could lead to more 
favorable solutions in comparison with the centralized legislature. The equities law 
should be left to the federation, because of the fact that the equities are a delicate issue 
and are dealt with by individuals, and therefore the common regulations would help the 
citizens cope with it and help to avoid the errors made due to the unfamiliarity with the 




   The minimal rational economic association of two states implies the customs union. 
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   Customs system of the union of Serbia and Montenegro should be common. It is the 
only way to ensure the unity of the market and economic area. 
   Different customs policy of the members (higher or lower customs duties or policy of 
contingency) a la free trade zone, would lead to, through the right of free circulation of 
goods and services on the entire market, customs competition of the members and 
going round customs regulations in one member through the other member. These 
processes would lead to, either: 
1. trade war between the members and possible disintegration of the common market, 
or, 
2. creating common customs system. 
  The third possibility – constant voluntary cooperation between the governments of the 
members on balancing their customs policies – is only theoretical, because it would, for 
lack of obligation, bring inferior results too often. The alternative for the previously 
mentioned options is the imposing of the regulation on the origin of goods, i.e. to keep 
the customs control between the members and to allow duty-free trade only for the 
goods manufactured in the other member, and not in a third country, which requires 
complex administration and significantly decreases positive effects of removing the 
barriers for the trade. 
   Customs service must be common in order to execute customs policy in an equal 
manner and to avoid the loss of confidence between the members. Customs houses 
could be managed by the individuals from the member on whose territory the customs 
house is, but it would be good that in the beginning, until the confidence is established 
and until the rule of the law prevails, the manager and assistant manager of the customs 
house are from different member republics. 
   The union aims at being included in the World Trade Organization, which implies the 
reduction and standardizing of the customs duties, removing the non-customs barriers 




   The union of Montenegro and Serbia should have a common currency, because they 
are areas connected by intensive trade, which had similar cyclic fluctuations, and 
between which there was a free circulation of the production factors (until recent events), 
and this fulfils the conditions of the Optimal currency area theory of the Nobel-prize 
winner Robert Mundell. 
   Common currency facilitates and instigates the trade on the common market. It is done 
in several ways: 
· by avoiding greater fluctuations of the mutual trade and transfer of capital, as a 
result of the changes of the exchange-rates of the separate currencies of Serbia 
and Montenegro, appearing because of different monetary policies; 
· by reduction of the costs of the transactions through avoiding losses 
(commission) in the process of money exchange and the costs of insurance 
against the risk of exchange-rate fluctuations; 
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· by simplification of economic calculation and creating the more predictable 
ground for business decisions as a result of less risks; 
· by a complete transparency of the prices on the entire market, because they are 
expressed in the same units in all the members. 
   The Central Bank should be independent and, above all, concentrated on keeping the 
prices stable, as the leading central banks of today. The other goals of economic policy 
could be realized only if they do not endanger the first goal. 
   The independence of the Central Bank from the government and politics in general is 
necessary in order to avoid subjecting monetary policy to the short-term political criteria 
of opportuneness, which may endanger the quality of monetary policy. 
   The Central Bank being dedicated to keeping the stability of the prices is necessary, 
lest the tasks of instigating economic development, reducing the unemployment or 
improving the business of companies and banks are assigned to it, which the monetary 
policy neither can, nor should do, so that it would not create the inflation.  
   The Central Bank should not be the last resort to the banking system, in order to avoid 
proinflatory financing. The Federal Ministry of Finances should avoid it also, so that the 
members would  be allowed neither to be irresponsible towards the banks, nor to try to 
transfer the costs of such policy to the federal level. It could be the role of the Republic 
Ministry of Finances, for the banks on its territory, because only it can have the real, 
long-term funds at its disposal. 
   The Central bank should not be the last resort to the Federal Government. Federal 
Government, as all the other governments in FRY, should not have privileges on the 
monetary market, but to incur debts, if it is necessary, on the commercial market under 
usual conditions. Every government should have a strict budget limitation by disabling it 
to transfer its costs to someone else (the other level, Central Bank etc). 
   Monetary policy of the Central Bank should be run by the Monetary Board, consisting 
of independent respectful individuals. In its first mandate, the Monetary Board should 
consist of the equal number of experts from Montenegro and Serbia, in order to establish 
the trust of the members in the beginning. 
   The Central Bank would not run the monetary policy through selective crediting or 
other selective arrangements, but in the way common to the modern market economies 
(open market transactions, escont rates and compulsory reserves). 
   Later, after more detailed analyses, we should consider reforms of the monetary 
system, where we have as possibilities the currency board and the introduction of Euro. 
Both concepts have its advantages and disadvantages as compared with the classic 
system of the central bank. Therefore, in the bases of the constitutional reform of FRY 
specific monetary arrangements should not be included, as it was done in the platform 
“Bases of new relations of Montenegro and Serbia” with the currency board. (A few 
months later Montenegro itself abandoned the idea of the currency board and accepted 





   The fiscal system of a country can be formed in very different ways, which is confirmed 
by the general experience. Some countries have oriented towards significant fiscal 
centralization, and the others towards decentralization. It is similar with the federations, 
only with a higher degree of decentralization. It is interesting that centralization is more 
expressed in the less developed than in the developed countries. 
   The fiscal system in Yugoslavia is traditionally highly decentralized, significantly more 
than it is suggested by the theory of fiscal federalism, only without being accompanied 
by the necessary instruments of coordination and harmonization. Such a fiscal system 
was constantly criticized, among others by the IMF, from the macroeconomic and 
distributive point of view. Namely, according to the theory of fiscal federalism, the 
following functions should be performed on the federal level: stabilization, redistribution, 
general public goods (defense and suchlike), functions that have wide extern effects, i.e. 
those which surpass the individual members. As for the revenues, those are pro-cyclic 
taxes, taxes with mobile base, re-distributive taxes and taxes on the base with uncertain 
regional belonging, i.e. corporation tax, income tax for the citizens, tax on the added 
value and customs duties. 
   However, the union of Montenegro and Serbia, as defined in this document, will not be 
a usual federation, but a decentralized, minimal federation. Therefore, the solutions will 
also be somewhat different from the usual principles of fiscal federalism.  
   The federal level will have its budget, from which the agreed functions will be financed 
(army, federal administration etc.). The federation would have limited functions, starting 
from the concept of minimal federation, and so the budget would be relatively small. 
   There would be no transferring of revenues between the members through the federal 
level, i.e. there would be no re-distributive function through the federal subsidy, if only for 
the reason that Serbia and Montenegro are equally developed countries, and therefore 
there is no need for the transfers of this kind. Besides, redistribution of revenues through 
federal arrangements causes significant resistance and endangers even very stable and 
mature federations, and it should be avoided in the case of Serbia and Montenegro. 
   The federation revenues should come from the customs duties and the newly imposed 
tax on the added value, which would take the place of the existing excise tax, bearing in 
mind that the tax on the added value is a formal condition for a country for joining the 
European Community. Customs duties by their nature belong to the federal level, since it 
cannot be known in which member republic will the imported merchandize reach the 
consumers. Strong reasons of the administrative nature suggest leaving the added value 
tax on the federal level. The existence of two republic taxes on the added value would 
cause serious administrative problems, since this tax is collected in every phase of the 
processing. If the system of the added value taxes is not common, then it is necessary 
for the reproductive goods to have foreign trade treatment in the inter-republic trade, 
which would lead to serious administrative complications and annul the common market. 
For the same reasons –administrative problems, high costs and negative influence on 
the common market - the European Committee suggested the introduction of the 
common VAT on the level of union. Therefore it is best for this tax to be federal in the 
federation of Serbia and Montenegro. 
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   If the revenues from the customs duties and the added value tax would exceed the 
amount necessary for financing the federal budget, two solutions are possible. First, to 
reduce the tax rates; second, to transfer the extra revenue to the members, according to 
the amount of the collected added value tax on their territories.  
   The right to incur debts, in the state and abroad, would have both the federation and 
the members. In many federations, the federal level controls the debts of other levels in 
order to prevent them from running into excessive debt, but it would not be suitable for 
the suggested character of the union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
   The federation would not be responsible for the finances of the members, and 
therefore it would not intervene (nor it could do so) when the fiscal systems of the 
members get into difficulties because of excessive debts, deficit and suchlike. It would 
discourage the excessive use of finances in the member republics, followed by running 
into debts, which would possibly be done with the intention to transfer their expenditures 
to the level of federation, as it is common practice among members of federation. 
   The member republics would organize the financing of all the needs that are not 
transferred to the federation, as well as the sources for these finances. As for the 
expenditures, they would be expenditures on social insurance, education, science, 
judiciary, police, administration etc. When revenues are concerned, the member 
republics would organize all kinds of revenues, except for those belonging to the 
federation. 
   Stabilization aspect of the fiscal policy in the federation would have modest influence, 
since the budget of the federation would be relatively small, the taxes important for the 
policy of stabilization (corporation tax, income tax) would belong to the member 
republics, debts would not be controlled by the federation, and there would be no 
stabilization transfers from the federation to the members. Therefore, as a minimum, the 
limits of the deficit financing of the budget of the federation and the members should be 
set in advance, as it is done in the European Community. In this way, a serious 
economic destabilization of the state as a result of an expansive fiscal policy would not 
be possible. Additional elements of the stabilization policy might be established by 
reaching an agreement, if the need arises. 
   Free organization of the taxes (and contributions) by the member republics has the 
advantage of understanding local particularities of the economic and social condition. 
However, it can lead to important inefficiencies: the members may discriminate citizens 
and companies from the other member; the members may have the policy of tax 
competition; there may be the unwanted double taxation of certain incomes and no 
taxation whatsoever of other incomes, etc. More importantly, different tax rates on the 
territorial principle make the business conditions different also, and in that way endanger 
the common market and represent an impediment to efficient allocation of resources. 
   Because of that, harmonization of the taxes is necessary, in order to protect the 
common market, avoid the mentioned inefficiencies, reduce administrative expenditures 
and increase the transparency of the taxes.  
   The bases of the tax system would be defined on the federal level, as it is suggested in 
the platform “Bases of new relations between Montenegro and Serbia”, in order to 
ensure transparency and avoid the “holes” in the taxation. Also, the bases of the tax 
policy would be harmonized according to the agreement between the Governments of 
the member republics. Such a harmonization could keep the advantages of the 
decentralization and avoid its potential weaknesses. The failure in harmonizing the tax 
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system and policy by an agreement could lead to harmonization through tax competition. 
However, the concept of competitive federalism, known in theory for a long time, is not 
the most favorable solution for the countries in transition. 
   Infrastructures of the common interest should be financed based on the agreement 




    
   The government system of the state union will be based on the principle of distribution 
of power. The bicameral Federal Parliament will have the legislative power, President of 
the Republic and Federal Government will have the executive power, and the courts 
(Federal High Court and Federal Constitutional Court) will represent the judicature. It is 
already mentioned (in the section about the federal distribution of authority) that certain 
federal laws (from the mixed jurisdiction fields) are implemented by the republic organs, 
which can also be authorized by the Federal Government to implement certain laws from 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federation. In that way, the republic Governments are 
being included in the federal system of government. 
   In the general concept of distribution of authority, it is important to establish efficient 
mechanisms of mutual cooperation and control of the constitutional authorities, as well 
as constant instruments of responsibility for every one of them. In the state union of two 
members, as it is seen in modern federations, this is a delicate issue and it must be 
given particular attention in the Constitution. 
 
   Federal Parliament  
 
   Federal Parliament is the main representative and legislative body of the state union. It 
passes laws and other federal decisions, controls the federal budget and final bill, 
decides on the union entering the international organizations, ratifies the international 
treaties, controls the work of the Federal Government and other federal organs, elects 
and removes from office the President of the Republic and the president of Federal 
Government, Supreme Court judges, the Federal District Attorney and the Governor of 
the National Bank, declares state of war or state of emergency. 
   Federal Parliament consists of two councils: the Council of Republics and the Council 
of Citizens (as in the present Constitution of FRY). Decisions are made in a bicameral 
procedure, with the majority of votes of the representatives in each of the councils. The 
mandate of representatives in both councils is four years. Considering the manner of 
electing and structure of the parliamentary councils, we should keep the solutions of the 
existing Constitution. 
   The representatives of the Council of Citizens are elected from the electorate of 65000 
voters on parliamentary elections in the republics, based on common federal election 
law. This principle is corrected by constitutional clause on at least thirty representatives 
from a republic in this council (article 80, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution), which 
practically refers only to Montenegro. 
   This is the constitutional solution that provoked serious public and expert debates, 
since it endangers the constitutional principle on the equality of the citizens in the 
federation. If the election of the representative for the Council of Citizens is based on 
14000 voters in Montenegro, the result is that the vote of a Montenegrin voter is worth 
almost five times more that the vote of a voter from Serbia. Bearing this disproportion in 
mind, we still keep the same solution, because it, firstly, makes the parliamentary life 
more dynamic and, secondly, facilitates the choosing of the Federal Government and its 
work. 
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   The representatives in this council have an independent mandate and, no matter 
which unit they were elected in, they represent the interests of the federation as a whole. 
   The representatives in the Council of Republics (twenty from each republic) represent 
the interest of the republics in the Federal Parliament. They, however, are not tied by the 
imperative mandate, but they act independently according to the recommendations of 
the Republic Parliaments. This suggestion is motivated by the same reasons as the 
suggestion of the minimum number of the representatives from one republic in the 
Council of Citizens: it makes the parliamentary life more dynamic, in this case by 
preventing veto of the representatives of one republic in this council. Its representatives 
are elected based on the appropriate republic election laws. 
   Since this council consists of the representatives of two republics, the usual procedure 
of the representatives being chosen by the Republic Parliaments is politically justified. 
But, we should introduce two constitutional corrections of the usual practice. First, we 
should introduce the constitutional recommendation that the structure of every republic 
delegation is proportional to the structure of the Republic Parliament. If the member 
republics would accept it, we could avoid the political manipulations concerning the 
structure of the delegations, which happened in Serbia 1993 and in Montenegro 1998. 
Second, we should introduce the constitutional regulation on the permanent mandate 
and acting of the republic delegation in this council for the period of four years. In this 
way we could avoid the blockage of the entire parliament (since it makes decisions in a 
bicameral procedure), which could ensue as a result of snap elections in some of the 
members. (It has already happened after the snap elections for the Serbian Parliament 
in 1992, when, because of the changes in the Serbian law on the election of 
representatives in the Council of Republics, the delegation was not formed in time, and 
so the Council of Republics did not function for several months). 
   Because of the bicameral manner of decision making in the Federal Parliament, the 
federal legislative procedure is a process of joint decision making. If the decision is not 
made because of the opposition of one of the parliamentary councils, the procedure of 
decision making is repeated after a year’s time, and the existing law is being 
implemented during that period. If the process of decision making should fail on the 
same proposal (the propounder may change the proposal in the meantime), after a year, 
the Federal Parliament is dissolved and within sixty days the new elections are held. 
   The Councils of the Federal Parliament have their president and vice-president. The 
president and vice-president of the Council of Republics are elected from the republic 
delegations and they change offices with each other after two years. The president and 
the vice-president of the Council of Citizens are chosen by lot among the candidates 
proposed by the representative clubs in this council. Their mandate lasts four years. 
   The Federal Parliament can be dissolved by the President of the Republic in case the 
Federal Parliament is unable to constructively vote down the Federal Government. 
   The Federal Parliament has its commissions and boards. One of the reasons for the 
constitutional regulation on the minimum number of representatives in the Council of 
Citizens from a republic (Montenegro) is the adequate participation of the 
representatives of this council in the work of parliamentary commissions and boards. In 
their work, the commissions and boards must consult the Federal Government and 
Republic Parliaments. The initiators of the legislature in Federal Parliament are Federal 
Government, federal representatives from the both councils, and the Governor of the 
Central Bank in the field of monetary policy.  
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   The work and authority of the Federal Parliament can be taken over by the Federal 
Government only in case of war or emergency. During that period, the Government 
passes the acts that have legal power, and which become invalid after the termination of 
the state of war or emergency. 
 
President of the Republic  
 
   President of the Republic is a person of undivided public reputation in the entire 
country. In the country, he acts as a politically neutral authority (pouvoir neutre), which is 
the best recommendation for representing the country abroad. Therefore, there should 
be a constitutional recommendation that the President of the Republic should not be a 
member of any party. It is understandable that, while holding this office, he/she cannot 
hold any other public office or perform professional duty. 
   The constitutional role and duties of the President of the Republic should be similar to 
those defined in the present Constitution. He signs federal laws and ratification 
instruments for the international treaties, proposes the mandator of the Federal 
Government, the judges of the Constitutional and High Court, Federal Prosecutor and 
the Governor of the Central Bank to the Federal Parliament. He schedules the elections 
for the Federal Parliament and dissolves it in case of failure to constructively vote down 
the Federal Government. He appoints and acquits the ambassadors and keeps 
diplomatic communication with foreign countries. As opposed to the present 
Constitution, where there is no such concept, for all the acts of the President of the 
Republic the signature of the President of the Federal Government or the Minister of the 
department in question is necessary. The exception is the appointing of the Federal 
Premier and the dissolving of the Federal Parliament. 
   The President of the Republic is the commander of the Army in war and peace, 
according to decisions of the Supreme Defense Council. The members of this Council 
are, besides the President of the Republic, presidents of the member republics. The 
President of the Republic presides over this Council and decisions are made by majority 
of votes.  
       The President of the Republic is elected by the Federal Parliament by the majority of 
the representatives’ votes in each of the Councils, for the period of five years. The 
president can only have one term of office. The presidential candidate is nominated by 
the representative clubs of the Federal Parliament, consulting the Presidents of the 
member republics and the Presidents of the Parliaments of the member republics. 
   The Federal Parliament can suggest the impeachment of the president in case that the 
majority of the representatives in each of the councils think that the President has 
violated the Federal Constitution. In that case, a parliamentary council starts the 
proceedings to estimate the actions of the President of the Republic before the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which makes the final decision on whether he violated the 
Constitution or not. This is a solution from the Constitution of Montenegro (art. 87, par.2 
and 3), which is better than the solution included in the Federal Constitution (art. 97, par. 
7). It prevents the discretion of the Parliament concerning the President of the Republic, 
and it concentrates on the legal side of his responsibility, for which only the opinion of 
the Court is relevant. 
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   It is recommended that the President of the Republic and the President of the Federal 
Government be not from the same republic, except in case of unintentional periodical 
overlapping of mandates because of the different length of the term of office.  
 
Federal Government  
 
   The Federal Government is the major institution of the executive power in the system 
of distribution of authority, although the concept of executive power represented here 
implies, on one hand, bicephalous executive power on the federal level (Government 
and President of the Republic as the bearers), and, on the other hand, cooperation in 
implementation of the federal laws and other decisions, between the Federal and 
Republic Governments. These two features of the federal executive power, however, in 
no way lessen the authority and the central position of the Federal Government in its 
constitutional position and the obligations that ensue. Moreover, we should keep the 
solutions contained in the present Constitution for their rationality. The problem is that, 
both in former and present practice of the executive power, the main role was 
unconstitutionally held by other political factors. 
   The Federal Government should be organized on the chancellor model, similar to its 
present constitutional position. The Federal Government appoints and acquits the 
President of the Government, as its mandator, on the suggestion of the President of the 
Republic. The mandator is authorized to form the Government and he is responsible for 
its functioning. His acquittal or resignation obligates the whole Government to resign. As 
a rule, the President of the Government is nominated by the party or the coalition that 
had the greatest number of votes in federal elections in any of the republics. To provide 
the parliamentary majority for the Government and, in that way, its stability, it is 
supposed that the inter-republic coalitions will take part in the federal elections for the 
Council of Citizens. This is especially important when the parties from Montenegro 
nominate the mandator, because the support of representatives from Serbia to the 
Government then becomes decisive. 
   All the members of the Federal Government are chosen solely by the mandator, which 
means that, in his choice, he is not governed by the republic criteria. His duty is only to 
choose the Deputy-Ministers of the Departments from the different republic than the 
Minister’s. The inauguration of the Ministers is performed in both Councils of the 
Parliament, while for their acquittal, the majority in one of the Councils is necessary.  
   The Government organizes its work by itself and brings decision within its jurisdiction, 
starting from the principle of collegiality and departments. Bearing in mind the number of 
federal fields of jurisdiction, the Federal Government will have five members. These are 
the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Justice, Defense, Foreign Affairs and Finances. 
   The main duty of the Federal Government is to establish and lead the domestic and 
foreign policy, to suggest and implement federal laws and other decisions. In the 
process of performing its functions, it must cooperate with the republic institutions of the 
executive power. This is a new solution compared to the dual system of execution 
implied by the present constitutional system (on the contrary, the practice is various; 
while the federation functioned, the republic executive organs, mostly in Serbia, passed 
laws on the matters under federal authority). When the executing of the federal 
regulations from the field of federal authority is in the question, the Federal Government 
itself passes the administrative acts (regulations, decisions and other sub-legal acts), 
 27 
and through its bodies performs the adequate administrative functions. In case it 
transfers some of these functions to the republic executive organs, its duty is to control 
the manner of execution and assist them if necessary. The Federal Government is also 
obligated to supervise and control the implementation of the federal regulations from the 
field of mixed jurisdictions, for which the executive and administrative organs of the 
republics are constitutionally responsible. In conducting the foreign affairs, the Federal 




   The member republics are responsible for the implementation of the laws of the state 
union. They are obliged to ensure three levels in the process of decision making in their 
legal systems.  
   The legal organs of the union of Montenegro and Serbia are Federal High Court and 
the Federal Constitutional Court. 
    
Federal High Court 
 
   Federal High Court decides on:  
1. extraordinary legal means against the decision of the Republic Court, when the issue 
is the implementation of federal laws, 
2. extraordinary legal means against the decision of the Republic Court, if this decision 
violates the fundamental civil rights, 
3. the legality of the final administrative act of the state union, 
4. the legal proceedings concerning property of the federation and the member 
republics, 
5. the legal proceedings concerning elections. 
The judges of the Federal High Court are chosen by the Federal Parliament, on the 
suggestion of the President of the Republic, and with consent of the Judicial Council, 
which consists of: three delegates of the Council of Republics from each member 
republic, two Judges of the Supreme Court from each member republic, the Public 
Prosecutors of each member republic and one lawyer from each member republic of 
the federation. The Judicial Council is presided over by the President of the 
Republic, but without the right to vote. The President of the Federal High Court is the 
oldest judge of that Court. 
 
   Federal Constitutional Court 
 
   The Federal Constitutional Court decides on:  
1. conformity of the constitutional regulations of the member republic with the 
Constitution of the federation of Montenegro and Serbia, 
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2. conformity of the laws of the federation with the Constitution of the federation, 
3. conformity of the general acts of the federal organs with the Constitution of the 
federation, 
4. conformity of the republic laws with the Constitution of federation, 
5.  conflict of authority between the organs of the member republics and organs of 
the federation, and also between the military and civil organs, 
6. the constitutional complaint on the violations of the fundamental civil rights, done 
by an individual act or action of an organ, either of the federation, or the member 
republic. The constitutional complaint can be made by the citizen of the 
federation only when all legal means for the protection of his rights are 
exhausted, both in the federal and republic institutions, 
7. conformity of the act of a political party or public association with the Constitution 
or a law of the federation. If the Court determines the existence of the conflict, it 
can prohibit the party or association in question, i.e. annul the unconstitutional or 
illegal regulation, 
8. the responsibility of the President of the Republic for violating the Constitution of 
the federation, 
9. the general issue of minority protection. 
   The procedure in the Federal Constitutional Court can be initiated by: the citizen 
whose right is violated (6), the Minister of Justice of the member republic or the Minister 
of Justice of the federation or the Public Prosecutor of the federation (7), the Federal 
Government, the Government of the member republic or ten members of the republic 
representative body or ten representatives of the Council of Republics (1-4), the 
President of the Supreme Court of the member republic or the President of the High 
Court and of the Government of the member republic or the Federal Government (5), 
Federal Parliament (8), and the President of the Republic (9). 
   The Federal Constitutional Court has eight judges. The Council of Republics and the 
Council of Citizens choose four judges each, on the suggestion of the President of the 
Republic, and with the consent of the Judicial Council. There must be four judges from 
the each member republic. The term of office of the judge is eight years. Every fourth 
year half of the judges are changed. The President of the Constitutional Court is the 
oldest judge of that Court.  
   The Judges of the Federal Constitutional Court must possess the degree at the 
Faculty of Law, the Judicial Exam, at least fifteen years experience and high reputation 
in the legal profession. 
 
Dislocation of the federal institutions 
 
   The capital of the federation will supposedly be Belgrade. However, it does not mean 
that all federal institutions will be concentrated in Belgrade, as it was the case up until 
now. Some of them will be located in some of the cities of Montenegro. Dislocation of the 
federal institutions is a common practice in federations and it has symbolic meaning. For 
the federation with only two federal units this issue may be even more significant than in 
other modern federations. 
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Balancing of power and the issue of responsibility 
  
  The system of government in the federation must be balanced both on vertical and 
horizontal plain. The manner of distribution of authority between the members and the 
federation, as well as rights and obligations of the cooperation between the federal and 
republic organs in the executive and the judicial area, which are suggested here, 
guarantee that the relations in the federation – between the republics, and between the 
republics and the federation – will be both functional and balanced. Concerning the 
mutual cooperation, control and appropriate balance between the federal organs 
themselves, the most important is the constitutional issue of responsibility. 
   The Constitution should establish certain mechanisms and instruments that will 
guarantee the responsibility of all constitutional power-bearers.  
   The Federal Parliament is elected by the citizens of the federation and by Republic 
Parliaments. It is dissolved only in two cases: first, if it is not able to approve the 
proposal of the law in both Councils, and second, if it is not able to vote down the 
Federal Government. 
   The President of the Republic is chosen by the Federal Parliament, but the Parliament 
can only suggest his impeachment and start the legal proceedings. The final decision is 
brought by the Federal Constitutional Court because this parliamentary suggestion is 
valid only when the President of the Republic has violated the Constitution. For his acts, 
the Federal Government (the President and the members) accepts the joint 
responsibility. 
   Finally, the most delicate issue is the responsibility of the Federal Government, 
because it holds the most operative state affairs and, potentially, the greatest political 
power, especially in a chancellor system suggested here. The Federal Parliament 
chooses and acquits the Federal Government through the mandator, and on proposal of 
the President of the Republic. The President of the Government is responsible before 
the Federal Parliament for the work of Federal Government and the members of the 
Federal Government are responsible to him. The President and the members of the 
Government must answer to the questions of the representatives within the previously 
appointed time (question time). In every parliamentary council minimum twenty 
representatives can challenge the Federal Government and, after the debate, vote it 
down. In order to acquit the Federal Government, it is necessary that it be voted down in 
one of the Councils. The question of trust can be started by the President of the Federal 
Government also, and the Federal Parliament decides upon it in the same way as when 
the question is started by the Federal Parliament itself (art.103, par.3 and 4). 
   As opposed to the existing constitutional solutions, both of these cases are 
constructive, which means that the Federal Parliament must have the alternative 
suggestion for the mandator of the Federal Government in advance. If this condition is 
not fulfilled, the Federal Parliament can be dissolved by an act of the President of the 
Republic and the new elections are held in sixty days. In that way the question of 
responsibility of the Federal Parliament itself is opened. 
   The Constitution should also regulate interpellation, as a powerful means of 
parliamentary control of the Government, which does not exist in the present 
Constitution, and it is not well regulated in the operating procedures of the Parliamentary 
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Councils. The issue of interpellation is started by certain number of representatives in 
any of the councils, after which the general debate ensues. In case the Government 
gives an unsatisfying answer, the representatives can initiate voting down the Federal 
Government. 
 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution  
 
   Since the final decision on the establishing of the Federal Constitution is made by the 
citizens of the republics, they should also have the final word considering the 
amendments of the Constitution, partially or on the whole. Since we suggest the 
referendums of the citizens in both republics, the procedure is simpler than the solution 
in the present Constitution. The proposal on the amendment can be put forward by the 
voters themselves (100,000), at least thirty representatives in the Council of Citizens, at 
least twenty representatives in the Council of Republics and the Federal Government 
(art. 139, par. 1 of the Constitution of FRY). The proposal must be accepted by the 
majority of representatives in each of the councils of the Federal Parliament. On the 
referendum the majority of voters in both republics should vote in favor of the 
amendments, the referendum being valid if more than 50% of the entire electorate in the 
republics vote. In this way the final decision on the amendment of the highest act of the 
state union is left to the only bearers of sovereignty, the citizens of the member 
republics.  
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Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies 
 




The Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS) is a nonparty, non-governmental and 
non-profit think tank institution.  
 
The CLDS was founded to promote:  
 
· individual liberty  
· free market economy and economic development  
· the rule of law  
· responsible and limited government  
· democracy  
 
To achieve these goals activities of the CLDS are oriented toward:  
 
· reforms of the political system  
· economic transition  
· building civil society  
· cooperation between individuals, local communities, and states  
· protection of human and minority rights  
· education of citizens  
· research and publishing of the liberal thought  
 
The main lines of activity are:  
 
· research  
· influencing public opinion  
· education  
 
Current Projects  
 
Establishing Labor Market  
Corruption in Serbia  
Freedom and Development  
Parliamentary Control of the Federal Government  
Economy and Democracy: The Public Choice Approach  
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